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LINER V. BROWN: WHERE SHOULD WE GO
FROM HERE-TWO
DIFFERENT APPROACHES FOR
NORTH CAROLINA
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1994, the North Carolina Court of Appeals limited the doc-
trine of parental immunity in Liner v. Brown' by refusing to
extend the doctrine to foster parents. The doctrine, which declares
that an unemancipated minor child cannot maintain an action
against his parent for personal injuries2 , was created by the North
Carolina Supreme Court in 1923 in the seminal case of Small v.
Morrison.' Numerous attempts to limit or abrogate the doctrine
in North Carolina have been rejected by the courts.4 And,
although the North Carolina General Assembly limited the doc-
trine in 1975 by abolishing its application in cases involving the
negligent operation of a motor vehicle,5 the Liner case stands as
the first attempt by the courts to limit the application of the doc-
trine without legislative intervention.
As one would expect, this decision caused concern on both
sides. For those who are against the doctrine, and who advocate
its complete abrogation, the ruling did not go far enough. And, for
advocates of the doctrine, it was an illogical and unfair restriction
of the doctrine to foster parents who stand in loco parentis to their
foster children.
This note examines both sides of the heated issue. Following
a brief recitation of the facts of the case, A. John Hoomani will
urge the North Carolina courts to go farther than they did in
Liner and completely abrogate the doctrine in favor of a more flex-
ible standard. Then, Kimberly Sieredzki Woodell will argue that
the Liner court made an incorrect decision by refusing to extend
the doctrine to foster parents.
1. 117 N.C. App. 44, 449 S.E.2d 905 (1994), disc. review denied, 340 N.C.
113, 456 S.E.2d 315 (1995).
2. Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 607, 610, 118 S.E. 12, 13 (1923).
3. Id. at 616, 118 S.E. at 16.
4. See infra note 55.
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (1996).
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Finally, the two authors provide separate conclusions urging
the North Carolina courts to reform the parental immunity doc-
trine by adopting one of the, two alternatives they advanced.
Mr. Hoomani concludes that North Carolina should adopt the
approach advocated by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895G.
By completely abolishing the doctrine of parental immunity, but
not holding parents liable in limited situations, the Restatement
balances the parent's interest in preserving parental authority
with the interests of the child in being compensated for tortious
acts committed by the parent.
Mrs. Sieredzki concludes that North Carolina courts should,
in the name of equity and fairness, allow foster parents to "receive
all the benefits associated with one standing as a natural parent
to a child,"6 including the protection of the parental immunity doc-
trine. Or, in the alternative, the North Carolina General Assem-
bly should shield foster parents from liability by providing state-
funded insurance for non-intentional torts.
II. THE CASE
Dennis and Veronica Richardson are the divorced parents of
Ambra D. Richardson, born 7 June 1987.7 Ambra lived primarily
with her mother until she was judged to be a dependent and
neglected juvenile and was placed in the legal and physical cus-
tody of the Forsyth County Department of Social Services ("DSS")
on 27 April 1990.8 In March of 1990, DSS placed Ambra in the
temporary custody of her paternal aunt and uncle, defendants
Ronald and Linetta Brown, where she remained for approximately
three and one-half months.9 Prior to March of 1990, Ambra had
spent weekends with the defendants for approximately eighteen
months.16 The defendants essentially functioned as Ambra's par-
ents from March of 1990 until 21 June 1990, when Ambra
drowned in the defendant's backyard swimming pool.11
David Liner, administrator of Ambra's estate, and Ambra's
mother commenced this action on 19 June 1992, alleging wrongful
death and negligent infliction of emotional distress, respectively. 12
6. Liner, 117 N.C. App. at 53, 449 S.E.2d at 910.
7. Id. at 46, 449 S.E.2d at 906.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 47, 449 S.E.2d at 906.
12. Id.
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Defendants filed an answer and defenses in which they stated
"[o]n the occasion referred to in the complaint the defendants
stood in loco parentis3 to Ambra D. Richardson. . . . so that the
doctrine of parental immunity [was] applicable to any claims
against the defendants ....
All parties filed motions for summary judgment as to both
causes of action. 15 By an order dated 21 July 1993, the trial court
granted defendants' motion for summary judgment for the wrong-
ful death claim based upon a finding that defendants were in loco
parentis to Ambra and therefore were entitled to enforce the
parental immunity doctrine. 16 The order also denied defendants'
motion for summary judgment as to the claim by Ms. Richardson
for negligent infliction of emotional distress.' 7  Both parties
appealed from the adverse judgments. The North Carolina Court
of Appeals dismissed defendants' appeal because the denial of a
summary judgment is not appealable. 8
In addressing plaintiffs appeal, the court considered: "(I)
whether defendants stood in loco parentis to Ambra; and (II) if so,
whether they are entitled to parental immunity as to the wrongful
death claim."' 9 Writing for a unanimous panel,20 Judge Greene
concluded that defendants did not stand in loco parentis to
Ambra.2 ' In support of this ruling the court found, among other
things, that DSS still retained both legal and physical custody of
Ambra pursuant to the 27 April 1990 order,22 and the issue of
reuniting Ambra with Ms. Richardson was to be considered at a
review hearing in ninety days.23 The court stated that defend-
ants' obligation to provide, and actual provision of, a stable envi-
ronment for Ambra for a two month period did not transform the
13. The term "in loco parentis" has been defined to mean "in the place of a
parent," and a "person in loco parentis" has been defined as "one who has
assumed the status and obligations of a parent without a formal adoption." Id.
at 48, 449 S.E.2d at 907.
14. Id at 47, 449 S.E.2d at 906..
15. Id. at 48, 449 S.E.2d at 907.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. For a discussion of Judge John's concurring opinion, see infra notes 32-43
and accompanying text.
21. Liner, 117 N.C. App. at 49, 449 S.E.2d at 907.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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relationship into one of parent and child.24 Given the fact that
defendants were not standing in loco parentis, the court ruled the
defendants were unable to enforce the parental immunity doctrine
and reversed their summary judgment.25
Moreover, the court went on to state that even if defendants
stood in loco parentis with Ambra, they would not be entitled to
claim immunity under the parental immunity doctrine.26 In
reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the policy reasons
underlying the doctrine seek to "preserve parental authority and
security of the home and protect the financial resources of the
family."27 Further, the court distinguished the cases in which
North Carolina courts have applied the doctrine to stepparents
standing in loco parentis28 , stating that the stepparent situation
is more permanent in nature than that of persons having tempo-
rary custody and control, and thus furthers the public policies
underlying the doctrine.29 However, the court explained that
where the interests of the child and natural parent are united,
and the child is only in the custody of others on a temporary basis,
"it is difficult to see how the policies of avoiding 'potential strife
between parent and child,' of protecting the family's financial
resources, and of preserving parental authority and security of the
home apply."30 The court then concluded that "[blecause exten-
sion of the parental immunity doctrine to one having temporary
custody and control of a child would not further the policies under-
lying the doctrine," foster parents standing in loco parentis are
precluded from enforcing the parent-child immunity doctrine.3 '
However, the court was not unanimous in this respect. Judge
John concurred in the result reached, but did not concur with the
24. Id at 50, 449 S.E.2d at 908. The court also stated "[d]efendants, like foster
parents, 'must strive to provide a stable environment and at the same time,
encourage, rather than discourage, the relationship of the foster child and
natural parent and ease the return of the child to the natural parent.'" Id.
(citations omitted).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. (citations omitted).
28. Morgan v. Johnson, 24 N.C. App. 307, 210 S.E.2d 503 (1974); Mabry v.
Bowen, 14 N.C. App. 646, 188 S.E.2d 651 (1972).
29. Liner, 117 N.C. App. at 51, 449 S.E.2d at 908.
30. Id.; See also Gulledge v. Gulledge, 367 N.E.2d 429,431 (Mll. Ct. App. 1977)
(the "rationale behind the rule loses its persuasive force as one considers
situations involving other than the actual parent").
31. Id. at 51, 449 S.E.2d at 909 (citations omitted).
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majority's conclusion that the doctrine was inappropriate for per-
sons standing in loco parentis.32 Whereas the majority relied on
the temporary nature of foster parent status to deny parental
immunity, Judge John noted that the very nature of an in loco
parentis relationship affixes "rights and duties temporary as
opposed to permanent in nature.""
Despite the temporary nature of most in loco parentis rela-
tionships, Judge John stated that the rights and duties inherent
to such relationships are substantially the same as between par-
ent and child. 4 In support of his argument, Judge John cited
numerous cases from other jurisdictions which have held that fos-
ter parents could, in certain circumstances, stand in loco parentis
and thus be entitled to enforce the parent-child immunity
doctrine.35
He also listed several factors which have been recognized as
necessary to a determination of whether a party stands in loco
parentis:36 the child's age;3 7 "the degree to which the child is
dependent on the person claiming to be standing in loco paren-
tis;"'s "the amount of support, if any, provided"39; "the extent to
32. Id. at 52, 449 S.E.2d at 909. Judge McCrodden concurred with Judge
Green's opinion.
33. Id. at 52 (quoting Miller v. Miller, 478 A.2d 351, 355 (N.J. 1984)).
34. Id.
35. Id.; See also In re Diana P., 424 A.2d 178, 181 (N.H. 1980), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 964 (1981) ("To conclude that foster parents can never stand in loco
parentis to a child in their care would be unrealistic"); Mathis v. Ammons, 453 F.
Supp. 1033, 1035 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (uncle stood in loco parentis to child who
resided with and was cared for by him; to rule otherwise "might have the effect of
discouraging the ... voluntary and unselfish . . . caring for a child in need of
parental support and guidance... "); Brown v. Phillips, 342 S.E.2d 786, 788 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1986) (where natural parents' custodial rights had been "severed" by the
juvenile court and child was placed in custody of county department of family
and children services, to allow parents to sue foster parents standing in loco
parentis for alleged negligence would violate state public policy favoring parental
immunity); Hush v. Devilbliss Co., 259 N.W.2d 170, 173 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977)
(one "who voluntarily assumes parental responsibility and attempts to create a
home-like environment for a child should be granted immunity from judicial
interference to the same extent as a natural parent"); Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So.
2d 801, 804 (Ala. 1992) ("foster parents should be afforded some protection by the
parental immunity doctrine"); Rutkowski v. Wasko, 143 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1955) ([n]o good reason" exists why parent-child immunity should be
applied to a natural parent and not in the case of one standing in loco parentis).
36. Id. at 54, 449 S.E.2d at 911.
37. Hush, 259 N.W.2d at 174.
38. Id. at 174-75.
1997] 451
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which duties commonly associated with parenthood are exer-
cised";41 "the amount of time the child has lived with the per-
son"41; and, "the degree to which a 'psychological family' has
developed."4 2 After considering these factors in relation to this
case, Judge John refused to accept the majority's conclusion that a
foster parent could never enforce the parental immunity doctrine,
submitting that "under our existing law foster parents and those
similarly situated may stand in loco parentis to a minor child and
avail themselves of the parental immunity doctrine during the
duration of that relationship."43
III. IT'S TIME TO ABOLISH PARENTAL IMMUNITY IN
NORTH CAROLINA
A. Introduction
In youth the currents of life are prodigal in their racing course,
and we should be slow to encourage or to permit a minor, in the
household of its parents, unemancipated and who has not yet
arrived at the age of discretion, acting only upon the advice of a
"next friend," to run the risk of losing a priceless birthright and a
rich inheritance in an effort to gain for the moment a mere mess of
pottage, or a few pieces of silver.44
Justice W.P. Stacy uttered these immortal words in 1923
when he brought North Carolina into the mainstream of American
legal thought by judicially adopting the parental immunity doc-
trine.4 5 Invented by the American legal system in the nineteenth
century,46 the parental immunity doctrine is a legal fiction with no
roots in English Common Law47 because, unlike the relation
between husband and wife, that of parent and child did not
involve at any stage of the common law any conception of legal
39. Id. at 175.
40. Id.
41. In re Diana P., 424 A.2d at 180.
42. Id. at 181.
43. Liner, 117 N.C. App. at 55, 449 S.E.2d at 911.
44. Small, 185 N.C. at 616, 118 S.E. at 16.
45. Id. The doctrine declares that an unemancipated minor child cannot
maintain an action against his parent for personal injuries. Id. at 610, 118 S.E.
at 13.
46. The following cases compromise the "Great Trilogy": Hewlett v. George, 9
So. 885 (Miss. 1891); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 77 S.W. 664 (Tenn. 1903); Roller v.
Roller, 79 P. 788 (Wash. 1905).
47. 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 127 (1978).
452 [Vol. 19:447
6
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 7
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol19/iss2/7
LINER V. BROWN
identity of the two parties. 48 As a result, the common law never
developed any immunity from liability between the two.
49
The justifications offered for the doctrine have included: (1)
preservation of family harmony and tranquility, (2) preservation
of parental care, discipline and control; (3) the analogy of parent-
child immunity to interspousal immunity; (4) the possibility that
the parent might reacquire the child's tort damages through
inheritance; (5) payment to the injured child would deplete the
parents' s assets to the detriment of the plaintiffs siblings; and (6)
the possibility of fraud and collusion in the presence of liability
insurance. 50
Over the years the justifications offered for the doctrine have
been soundly criticized as not being relevant to today's society.5 1
In fact, only a few jurisdictions still steadfastly apply the doc-
trine.52 However, although many jurisdictions have decided to
either limit its application 53 or abandon it altogether 54, North
48. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 895G cmt. b (1979).
49. Id.
50. See Harlin Ray Dean, Jr., It's Time To Abolish North Carolina's Parental
Immunity, But Who's Going To Do It? - Coffey v. Coffey and North Carolina
General Statutes Section 1-539.21, 68 N.C.L. REV. 1317, 1322 (1990).
51. 3 ROBERT E. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAw § 248, at 294 (4th ed.
Cumin. Supp. 1994); See also Silesky v. Kelman, 161 N.W.2d 631, 635 (Minn.
1968), quoting Signs v. Signs, 103 N.E.2d 743, 748 (Ohio 1952)
ordinarily, tort actions by minor children against their parents in
normal, harmonious families would be rare indeed because of the
natural concern of the parents to adequately provide and care for their
children, and where such actions were brought there would be a strong
indication that there was no harmony or domestic felicity in the family
involved to be disturbed. Id.
See also Broadbent v. Broadbent, 907 P.2d 43, 48 (Ariz. 1995) ("The injury to the
child, more than the lawsuit, disrupts the family tranquility. In fact, if the child
is not compensated for the tortious injury, then peace in the family is even less
likely").
52. Only ten States still recognize the parental immunity doctrine in its
original form : Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland,
Mississippi, Nebraska, Tennessee and Wyoming. See, e.g., Hill v. Giordno, 447
So. 2d 164, 164 (Ala. 1984); Horton v. Reaves, 526 P.2d 304, 308 (Colo. 1974);
Coleman v. Coleman, 278 S.E.2d 114, 114 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981); Pedigo v. Rowley,
610 P.2d 560, 564 (Idaho 1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:571 (West 1991); Frye v.
Frye, 505 A.2d 826, 836 (Md. 1986); McNeal v. Estate of McNeal, 254 So. 2d 521,
523 (Miss. 1971); Pullen v. Novak, 99 N.W.2d 16, 25 (Neb. 1959); Campbell v.
Gruttemeyer, 432 S.W.2d 894, 895 (Tenn. 1968); Oldman v. Bartshe, 480 P.2d 99,
101 (Wyo. 1971).
53. Twenty-six States have partially abrogated the parental immunity
doctrine: Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana,
1997] 453
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Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin. See, e.g., Attwood
v. Estate of Attwood, 633 S.W.2d 366, 371 (Ark. 1982) (unemancipated minor
may sue his parent for a willful tort); Dzenutis v. Dzenutis, 512 A.2d 130, 136
(Conn. 1986) (allowing children to sue parents where the parent commits a tort
while engaging in business activities); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572 (West
1991); Buffalo v. Buffalo, 441 N.E.2d 711, 714 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Fugate v.
Fugate, 582 S.W.2d 663, 669 (Mo. 1979); Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d
928, 933 (Tex. 1971) (abrogating the rule of parental immunity for negligence
which occurred in the conduct of business activities which were wholly outside
the sphere of parental duties and responsibilities); Wood v. Wood, 370 A.2d 191,
192 (Vt. 1977). Fourteen States have partially abrogated the doctrine in the
context of automobile accident cases. See, e.g., Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 15
(Alaska 1967); Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669, 673 (Del. 1976); Ard v. Ard,
414 So. 2d 1066, 1067 (Fla. 1982); Stallman v. Youngquist, 504 N.E.2d 920, 925
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 611 P.2d 135, 141 (Kan. 1980);
Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634, 639 (Me. 1979) (abrogating rule in specific
automobile cases, but reserving the right to recognize immunity in cases
involving parental care and discipline); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d 907,
908 (Mass. 1975); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Royale, 656 P.2d 820, 824 (Mont.
1983); Guess v. Gulf Ins. Co., 627 P.2d 869, 871 (N.M. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-
539.21 (Supp. 1994); Unah v. Martin, 676 P.2d 1366, 1370 (Okla. 1984); Silva v.
Silva, 446 A.2d 1013, 1016 (R.I. 1982); Smith v. Kaufman, 183 S.E.2d 190, 194
(Va. 1971); Merrick v. Sutterlin, 610 P.2d 891, 893 (Wash. 1980); Lee v. Comer,
224 S.E.2d 721, 724 (W. Va. 1976). Other States have followed the lead of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court and totally abrogated the doctrine of parental
immunity except in cases where the alleged negligent act involves (1) an exercise
of parental authority over the child, or (2) an exercise of ordinary parental
discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and
dental services, and other care. See, e.g., Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786, 789
(Iowa 1981); Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Ky. 1971); Plumley v. Klein,
199 N.W.2d 169,172-73 (Mich. 1972); Small v. Rockfeld, 330 A.2d 335, 343 (N.J.
1974); Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193, 198 (Wis. 1963).
54. Fourteen States either do not recognize or have totally abrogated the
parental immunity doctrine: Arizona, California, Hawaii, Minnesota, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota and Utah. See, e.g., Broadbent v. Broadbent, 907 P.2d
43, 49 (Ariz. 1995); Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648, 654 (Cal. 1971); Peterson v.
City of Honolulu, 462 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Haw. 1970); Anderson v. Stream, 295
N.W.2d 595, 598 (Minn. 1980); Rupert v. Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013, 1018 (Nev.
1974); Briere v. Briere, 224 A.2d 588, 591 (N.H. 1966); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 245
N.E.2d 192, 194 (N.Y. 1969); Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364, 366 (N.D. 1967);
Kirchner v. Crystal, 474 N.E.2d 275, 276 (Ohio 1984); Winn v. Gilroy, 681 P.2d
776, 784 (Or. 1984); Falco v. Pados, 282 A.2d 351, 353 (Pa. 1971); Elam v. Elam,
268 S.E.2d 109, 112 (S.C. 1980); Bishop v. Nielsen, 632 P.2d 864, 865 (Utah
1981). See also Stamboulis v. Stamboulis, 519 N.E.2d 1299, 1301 (Mass. 1988)
(where the Massachussetts court discussed in detail the decline of the parental
immunity doctrine, and the many emerging alternatives to the doctrine, but
454 (Vol. 19:447
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Carolina courts have consistently refused to abolish the doctrine
of parental immunity, instead bowing to the legislature to take
such action.
5 5
In Liner v. Brown, 6 the North Carolina Court of Appeals lim-
ited the application of the doctrine of parental immunity by refus-
ing to extend the doctrine to a foster parent situation.5 7 In its
reasoning, the court noted that the temporary nature of the cus-
tody and control of the child by the foster parent did not warrant
extension of the doctrine.5 8 However, the court's ruling served
merely as an additional limit on the doctrine's applicability and
failed to totally abrogate the doctrine.
My analysis has two objectives. First, it will discuss how the
parental immunity doctrine has evolved in North Carolina, as well
as in the rest of the country. And second, it will suggest that the
North Carolina courts follow the growing trend in the rest of the
country and abandon the doctrine in suits between parents and
children, in favor of the more flexible standard advocated by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895G.
B. History of the Parental Immunity Doctrine
1. Evolution of the Parental Immunity Doctrine in the
United States
The general rule that a parent is not liable for personal inju-
ries negligently inflicted upon a minor child is of comparatively
recent origin.5 9 Prior to the Mississippi Supreme Court case of
could not abrogate the doctrine on the record before it). South Dakota courts
have not addressed the issue of parental immunity.
55. See, e.g., Evans v. Evans, 12 N.C. App. 17, 18, 182 S.E.2d 227, 228 (1971);
Mabry v. Bowen, 14 N.C. App. 646, 647, 188 S.E.2d 651, 652 (1972); Skinner v.
Whitley, 281 N.C. 476, 484, 189 S.E.2d 230, 235 (1972) ("If the immunity rule in
ordinary negligence cases is no longer suited to the times... we think innovations
upon the established law in this field should be accomplished prospectively by
legislation rather than retroactively by judicial decree."); Lee v. Mowett Sales Co,
Inc., 316 N.C. 489, 494, 342 S.E.2d 882, 885 (1986) ("If the doctrine is to be
abolished at this late date, it should be done by legislation and not by the
Court."); Coffey v. Coffey, 94 N.C. App. 717, 721, 342 S.E.2d 467, 470 (1989); See
also Dean supra note 50.
56. 117 N.C. App. 44, 449 S.E.2d 905 (1994), disc. review denied, 340 N.C.
113, 456 S.E.2d 315 (1995).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. LEE, supra note 51, § 248, at 293.
4551997]
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Hewellette v. George60 in 1891, no appellate case, either in Eng-
land or the United States, had ever considered the question of the
tort liability of a parent for personal injuries to a minor child.6
However, despite the lack of adjudicated cases upon which to rely,
the Mississippi court ruled that a daughter could not sue her
mother for illegal imprisonment in an insane asylum 62, citing
that:
[Tihe peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a
sound public policy, designed to subserve the repose of families
and the best interest of society, forbid to the minor child a right to
appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for per-
sonal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent. The State,
through its criminal laws, will give the minor child protection
from parental violence and wrong doing, and this is all the child
can be heard to demand.63
The Hewellette decision was the first in a sweeping trend of
cases termed the "Great Trilogy."
In the second case of the triumvirate, McKelvey v. McKelvey64
the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that a minor child was barred
from bringing a claim against her father and stepmother for cruel
and inhuman treatment inflicted upon her by the stepmother with
the consent of the father.6 5 The court asserted that at common
law the duty of the father to maintain, protect and educate his
children carried with it a corresponding right to restrain and
inflict moderate chastisement upon the child.66
60. 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891).
61. LEE, supra note 51, § 248, at 293; See also supra note 48 and
accompanying text.
62. Hewlett, 9 So. at 887.
63. Id.
64. 77 S.W. 664 (Tenn. 1903).
65. Id. at 664.
66. Id. North Carolina courts have long recognized this most fundamental
principle, that parents should be allowed to bring up their children in the best
way they see fit, so long as the method is reasonable. In fact, the North Carolina
Supreme Court announced in 1837 that:
[o]ne of the most sacred duties of parents, is to train up and qualify their
children, for becoming useful and virtuous members of society; this duty
cannot be effectually performed without the ability to command
obedience, to control stubbornness, to quicken diligence, and to reform
bad habits; and to enable him to exercise this salutary sway, he is armed
with the power to administer moderate correction, when he shall believe
it to be just and necessary.
State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. 365, 365-366 (1837).
456 [Vol. 19:447
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The final case of the "Great Trilogy", Roller v. 'Roller6 7 , was
decided by the Washington Supreme Court in the early part of the
Twentieth Century. The defendant in Roller was convicted of rap-
ing his minor daughter and sentenced to a term of imprison-
ment.68 The minor daughter, fifteen years old at the time, then
attempted to recover $2,000 in damages from her father for inju-
ries resulting from the rape.6 9 The Washington court, relying on
the rationale set forth in Hewellette, and carrying the doctrine to
its extreme, denied recovery, based upon society's interest in pre-
serving harmony within the family.70 In so ruling, the court
stated:
The rule of law prohibiting suits between parent and child is
based upon the interest that has been manifested since the earli-
est organization of civilized government, an interest inspired by
the universally recognized fact that the maintenance of harmoni-
ous and proper family relations is conducive to good citizenship,
and therefore works to the welfare of the state.7 '
However, one can hardly imagine how preventing a minor
daughter from bringing an action against her father for sexually
assaulting her can preserve any family harmony, if there ever was
any to begin with.72
67. 79 P. 788 (Wash. 1905).
68. Id. at 788.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Numerous commentators have addressed this very situation. See, e.g.,
Caroline E. Johnson, A Cry For Help: An Argument For Abrogation of the Parent-
Child Tort Immunity Doctrine in Child Abuse and Incest Cases, 21 FLA. ST. U.L.
REv. 617 (1993) (commenting on Richards v. Richards, 599 So. 2d 135 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1992), in which the Florida District Court of Appeals upheld the circuit
court's ruling that the parent-child immunity doctrine barred a daughter from
suing her father for damages for an intentional tort, the sexual assault of the
daughter by her father. The court held that if the doctrine "is to be abrogated to
allow a child to bring an intentional tort action against a parent, it should be
done by statute." Id. at 137); Samuel Mark Pipina, In Whose Best Interest?
Exploring the Continuing Viability of the Parental Immunity Doctrine, 53 0HIO
ST. L.J. 1111 (1992) (commenting on Barnes v. Barnes, 566 N.E.2d 1042 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1991), in which the Indiana Court of Appeals overturned a verdict for a
daughter awarding compensatory and punitive damages resulting from the
sexual assault by her father. In dissent, Judge Conover stated that "there is not
one compelling reason for imposing [the parent-child immunity] doctrine to the
child's detriment in sexual battery cases. Nothing is lost and deterrent value is
gained by the doctrine's abolition." Id. at 1046-1047).
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2. Evolution of the Parental Immunity Doctrine in North
Carolina
Nearly thirty years after its initial inception, the parental
immunity doctrine was judicially adopted in North Carolina in
1923. 78 Justice Stacy, writing for his colleagues on the North Car-
olina Supreme Court, followed the trend which was emerging
across the nation when he accepted the doctrine into the annals of
North Carolina jurisprudence.
In Small v. Morrison, a nine-year old child brought an action
against her father and her father's insurance carrier for personal
injuries she allegedly suffered as a result of the negligent opera-
tion of an automobile owned and driven by the father.74 In sus-
taining the father's demurrer, the court pronounced:
It is well established that a minor child cannot sue his parent for a
tort... [a]nd this rule has been applied not only in cases of exces-
sive punishment, or other assault and battery, but to the most
extreme case possible, that of the ravishment of a minor daughter
by her father.75
In defense of its decision to adopt the doctrine, despite the fact
that there was no support for the doctrine in North Carolina case
law, the Court decreed that the doctrine was "unmistakably and
indelibly carved upon the tablets of Mount Sinai."7 6
As the doctrine evolved in North Carolina, numerous
attempts by plaintiffs to limit its application were rejected by the
North Carolina courts. 77 In Skinner v. Whitley 7s the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether
the estate of an unemancipated minor child may bring an action
against the father's estate for the wrongful death of the child
caused by the ordinary negligence of the deceased father.79 The
73. Small, 185 N.C. 607, 118 S.E. 12.
74. Id.
75. Id. At 610, 118 S.E. at 13; See also Roller, supra notes 67-72 and
accompanying text. In their holding, the Small court further proclaimed that
"there are some things that are worth more than money. One of these is the
peace of the fireside and the contentment of the home; for of such is the kingdom
of righteousness. While the family relation of parent and child exists, with its
reciprocal rights and obligations, the latter should not be taught to "bite the hand
that feeds it," and no such action as the present should be entertained by the
courts." Id. at 616, 118 S.E. at 16.
76. Id.
77. See supra note 55.
78. 281 N.C. 476, 189 S.E.2d 230 (1972).
79. Id. at 477, 189 S.E.2d at 230.
458 [Vol. 19:447
12
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 7
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol19/iss2/7
LINER V. BROWN
case involved an accident which occurred when a motor vehicle
driven by the father, in which his two daughters were passengers,
collided with an oncoming car, killing the father and both daugh-
ters.8 0 The administrator of the girls' estate brought a wrongful
death claim against the father's estate, alleging that the father's
ordinary negligence proximately caused the girls' deaths."' The
plaintiff urged the court to abandon the parental immunity doc-
trine and allow the minor children of the State to "plead their
wrongs at her altar of justice."8 2 Plaintiff further contended that
the rationale for the rule could not be applied to the facts of this
case, since by reason of the death of the daughters and their
father, there no longer existed a familial relationship that could be
disturbed by this action.8 3 In considering this argument, the court
noted that "the course plaintiff urges would create more problems
and inequities than it cures."8 4 Further, the court stated that a
total abrogation of the doctrine would lead to judicial supervision
of the household which is inconsistent with a parent's duty and
obligation to support, control, and discipline his children.8 5 Ulti-
mately, the court refused "piecemeal abrogation of established law
by judicial decree," 6 and instead deferred to the wisdom of the
legislature to make such a change.8 7
In response to the Supreme Court's refusal to modify the doc-
trine, the North Carolina Legislature limited the doctrine's appli-
cation in 1975 by abolishing the immunity in cases involving the
negligent operation of a motor vehicle. 8
80. Id. at 476-77, 189 S.E.2d at 230.
81. Id. at 477, 189 S.E.2d at 230.
82. Id. at 479, 189 S.E.2d at.232.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 484, 189 S.E.2d at 234. For example, the court questioned "[if suit
is allowed only in motor vehicle cases, by what logic is the right to sue denied for
injury to the child incurred by the parent's negligence in operating a golf cart or a
motor boat or a lawn mower or a power saw?" Id. Further, the court wondered
whether it would be logical to require the death of either the parent or child, or
both, in order to allow a child to bring a suit against the parent. Id. Moreover,
the court stated that conditioning the right to sue upon the existence of liability
insurance would "not only extend existing insurance contracts to coverage not
contemplated when the policies were written but also would create a preferred
class of minor unemancipated children-those injured in a motor vehicle
accident by a negligent father who carried liability insurance." Id.
85. Id. at 484, 189 S.E.2d at 235.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (1989).
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When next confronted with this issue, in Lee v. Mowett Sales
Co., Inc. ,9 the court again refused to abrogate the doctrine.90 In
Lee, father ran over his daughter's feet with a lawn mower, caus-
ing the amputation of her left foot and three toes of her right
foot.9 ' The child brought a complaint against the manufacturer of
the lawn mower, alleging that her injuries were the result of
defects in the lawn mower. 92 The manufacturer then filed a third-
party complaint against the father seeking contribution.9" Pursu-
ant to the father's motion, the trial court dismissed the suit on the
grounds that the father was entitled to enforce the parental
immunity doctrine, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.94 The
manufacturer urged the N.C. Supreme Court to abolish the doc-
trine of parent-child immunity, arguing that "the doctrine is rid-
dled with exceptions and is no longer backed by sound public
policy reasons."9 5 Nonetheless, the court refused to do so, noting
that "to judicially abolish the parent-child immunity doctrine after
the legislature has considered and retained the doctrine would be
to engage in impermissible judicial legislation."96
In Coffey v. Coffey,97 the N.C. Court of Appeals addressed a
somewhat different application of the doctrine. Whereas most of
the previous cases addressing the application of the doctrine
involved minor children suing their parents, this case involved a
mother suing her son for injuries sustained in an automobile acci-
dent.98 The alleged injury occurred when the son was sixteen
years old, thus precluding the mother's ability to sue based on the
parent-child immunity doctrine. 9 The mother, however, waited
89. 316 N.C. 489, 342 S.E.2d 882 (1986).
90. Id. at 490, 342 S.E.2d at 883 ("Because the parent-child immunity
doctrine is firmly embedded in our case law and the legislature has declined to
enact its abolition, we do not disturb the doctrine as it now exists").
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. The Court of Appeals relied on Watson v. Nichols, 270 N.C. 733, 155
S.E.2d 154 (1967), which stated that a third-party could not maintain an action
for contribution against a parent in such cases, since the parent cannot be held
liable in a direct action by the injured child due to the doctrine of parent-child
immunity.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 494, 342 S.E. 2d at 885.
97. 94 N.C. App. 717, 381 S.E.2d 467 (1989).
98. Id. at 718, 381 S.E.2d at 468.
99. Id. at 720, 381 S.E.2d at 470.
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until the son had reached the age of majority to bring the suit.100
The court held that the right to sue must exist at the time of the
injury, and therefore affirmed the lower court's ruling. 01 The
court noted that the statutory exception to the immunity doctrine
created by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-539.21 allowed a minor child to
bring suit against a parent for injuries resulting from the parent's
negligent operation of a motor vehicle,102 but concluded that "this
exception... is limited and [does] not abolish the unemancipated
minor's immunity from suits by his parents." 0 3
Eleven days after the Coffey decision the legislature amended
the statute, allowing parents to sue their minor children for inju-
ries sustained as a result of the child's negligent operation of a
motor vehicle. 104
C. Alternatives to the Parental Immunity Doctrine:
Although a number of states, in addition to North Carolina,
have confined their modification of the doctrine to cases involving
the negligent operation of a motor vehicle, 0 5 this narrow restric-
tion falls far short of the reforms made in other states10 6 and
results in the "piecemeal abrogation" the Skinner court attempted
to avoid. 10 7
100. Id. at 719, 381 S.E.2d at 469.
101. Id. at 720, 381 S.E.2d at 470.
102. Id. at 719, 381 S.E.2d at 469.
103. Id. (citations omitted).
104. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (1989). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 abolished a
parent's immunity to suit by a minor child for personal injury or property
damage arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle. The State legislature
amended the statute in 1989 to allow the reciprocal right of a parent to sue a
child for injuries sustained by the parent arising out of the minor child's
negligent operation of a motor vehicle. However, this amended statute failed to
totally abrogate the doctrine.
105. See supra note 53. Fifteen-States have limited their reform efforts in this
context: Alaska, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts,
Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Virginia,
Washington and West Virginia.
106. See supra note 54. Fourteen States do not recognize the doctrine in any
form: Arizona, California, Hawaii, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota
and Utah. See also supra note 53. Five States have totally abrogated the
doctrine except where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of parental
authority or discretion: Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, New Jersey and Wisconsin.
107. See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
1997] 461
15
Hoomani and Woodell: Liner v. Brown: Where Should We Go from Here - Two Different Appr
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1997
462 CAMPBELL LAw REvIEw [Vol. 19:447
"In recent years indications have appeared of a growing judi-
cial inclination to depart very materially from the broad doctrine
that an unemancipated minor cannot maintain a tort action
against his parent."10 8 The arguments which were originally
advanced in favor of application of the doctrine of parental immu-
nity °9 "no longer justify the doctrine for most purposes."110 In
light of the mounting criticism being waged against the parental
immunity doctrine, and the growing number of exceptions to the
rule, the time has arrived for the North Carolina courts to remove
the blanket immunity afforded to parents. A more flexible
approach, that preserves parental authority and discretion while
still allowing children to recover from their parents for negligent
acts which fall outside the scope of parental authority or for
grossly negligent acts which are within that scope of authority,
should be adopted.
The most viable of the justifications offered in support of the
doctrine, that of preserving parental care, discipline and con-
trol,"' has caused the most difficulty for states that have abol-
ished or modified the doctrine. Over the years, three approaches
have developed in courts across the country with regards to this
justification."12
First, in Goller v. White," 3 a foster child brought a suit
against his foster father and the foster father's insurer for injuries
he sustained while riding on the drawbar of a tractor operated by
the foster father." 4 The trial court found that the foster father
was standing in loco parentis to the foster child, and therefore was
entitled to enforce the parental immunity doctrine.115 In address-
ing the issue on appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized
that at common law a minor could maintain a suit against his par-
ent for disputes concerning property and contract rights." 6 The
court then rationalized that it would be difficult "to argue that the
108. First Union Natl Bank v. Hackney, 266 N.C. 17, 27, 145 S.E.2d 352, 360
(1965) (citations omitted).
109. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
110. Lee, 76 N.C. App. at 560, 334 S.E.2d at 253 (1985) (Becton, J., dissenting).
111. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
112. Lee, 76 N.C. App. at 562-63, 334 S.E.2d at 254-55 (citations omitted).
113. 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wisc. 1963).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 196.
116. Id. at 197.
16
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 7
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol19/iss2/7
LINER V. BROWN
law should protect the property rights of a minor more zealously
than the rights of his person."117
The Wisconsin Supreme Court then articulated its test that
retains the doctrine of parental immunity in only two situations:
"(1) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of paren-
tal authority over the child; and (2) where the alleged negligent
act involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with
respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and
dental services, and other care."" 8
Under the Goller approach, the parent is given broad discre-
tion with respect to the legal obligations of the child, but this dis-
cretion "does not extend to the ordinary acts of upbringing .. .
which are not of the same legal nature as providing food, clothing,
housing, medical and dental services." 119 In the areas not within
the legal obligations of the parent, the parent will presumably be
subject to a reasonableness standard. 20
However, there is one major problem with this approach: if a
parent's acts are within the established protected zone, then the
parent is in effect given a license to act negligently toward his
child.' 2 ' This result is inevitable with any standard which per-
mits immunity in some situations, because the parent is legally
unrestricted in his conduct in those protected areas. 2 2 For this
reason, the Goller approach, while a noble effort to solve the
problems which have been created by the immunity doctrine, still
falls short of correcting all of the evils created.
The second approach, which was adopted by the California
Supreme Court in Gibson v. Gibson, 23 attempts to redress the
shortcomings of the Goiter approach. In Gibson, a minor child
was injured by an oncoming vehicle when his father negligently
instructed him to go out on the roadway to inspect his vehicle's
tires.' 24 The trial court granted the father's motion to dismiss on
117. Id. (citations omitted).
118. Id. at 198.
119. Comment, The 'Reasonable Parent" Standard: An Alternative to Parent-
Child Tort Immunity, 47 U. CoLO. L. REv. 795, 807 (1976) [hereinafter
"Reasonable Parent"]; See also Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp.
Corp., 201 N.W.2d 745, 753 (1972).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 807; See also Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648, 652-653 (Cal. 1971).
122. Id.
123. 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971).
124. Id. at 649.
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the grounds that the father was immune from prosecution. 125
After conducting an extensive review of the parental immunity
doctrine, the California Supreme Court stated that while it agreed
with the Goller court's "recognition of the undeniable fact that the
parent-child relationship is unique in some aspects, and that
traditional concepts of negligence cannot be blindly applied to
it," 126 it rejected the Goller approach because it did not want to
perpetuate the "implication ... that within certain aspects of the
parent-child relationship, the parent has carte blanche to act neg-
ligently toward his child."127 In so ruling, the court totally abro-
gated the parental immunity doctrine in favor of the more flexible
"reasonably prudent parent" standard. This standard asks, "what
would an ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent have done in
similar circumstances?" 12
This is a much more flexible standard than that advanced by
the Goller court. In contrast to the Goller approach, the Gibson
approach treats all parental duties the same, applying the "rea-
sonably prudent parent" standard uniformly. 129 In effect, "this
standard holds the parent to a standard of reasonableness regard-
less of the nature of his activity, thus eliminating the abstruse,
often arbitrary division between immunity and liability existent
in other alternatives:" 30
However, this approach has received its share of criticism.
The chief complaint against this approach is that the court is not
in a position to judge the proper degree of discipline and supervi-
sion of a particular child.' 3 ' As one court points out:
[Clonsidering the different economic, educational, cultural,
ethnic and religious backgrounds which must prevail, there are so
many combinations and permutations of parent-child relation-
125. Id.
126. Id. at 652. For example, the court stated that "[o]bviously, a parent may
exercise certain authority over a minor child which would be tortious if directed
toward someone else. For example, a parent may spank a child who has
misbehaved without being liable for battery, or he may temporarily order the
child to stay in his room as punishment, yet not be held responsible for false
imprisonment." Id.
127. Id. at 652-53.
128. Id. at 653 (emphasis in original).
129. "Reasonable Parent," supra note 119, at 809.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 810.
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ships that may result that the search for a standard would neces-
sarily be in vain - and properly so.'" 2
For this reason, the Gibson approach, while doing more for
our children than the Goller approach, is not the proper remedy
for the problems created in North Carolina by the parental immu-
nity doctrine.
The final approach is that of the American Law Institute in
the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895G.133 In its commentary,
the Restatement notes that the "[clonstant criticism of the immu-
nity has led to its erosion by the development of numerous excep-
tions to it, which have been more or less sporadically recognized
by many courts, until there are now very few jurisdictions if any,
in which the immunity exists in any complete form. " 13 4 In an
attempt to clear up the confusion that has been caused by the doc-
trine, and to blend the good aspects from both the Goller and Gib-
son approaches, the Restatement announces that:
(1) A parent or child is not immune from tort liability to the other
solely by reason of that relationship; and, (2) Repudiation of gen-
eral tort immunity does not establish liability for an act or omis-
sion that, because of the parent-child relationship, is otherwise
privileged or is not tortious.135
There are two points which should be noted with regard to
this approach. First, in subsection (1) of the Restatement, the
authors follow the approach of the Gibson court by completely
abrogating the parental immunity doctrine. 136 Second, in subsec-
tion (2) of the Restatement, the authors offer an exception to this
denial of tort immunity. This exception exists when the act or
omission of the parent involves conduct which is either "privi-
leged" or "not tortious." This distinction between "immunity" and
"privileged or not tortious conduct" is the deciding factor in deter-
mining whether liability exists. 1 37
In Winn v. Gilroy,3 s the Oregon Supreme Court declined to
apply either the Goller or the Gibson approaches, noting that
"each has [its] shortcomings."' 3 Instead, the court chose to apply
132. Holodook v. Spencer, 324 N.E.2d 338, 346 (N.Y. 1974).
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G (1979).
134. Id. at cmt. d.
135. Id. at § 895G.
136. See Winn v. Gilroy, 681 P.2d 776, 782 (Or. 1984).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 783.
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the Restatement approach, stating that "the proper inquiry con-
cerns the tortious or privileged nature of a parent's act that causes
injury to the child, not a special parental immunity from a child's
action for personal torts as distinct from other kinds of claims.' 40
Expanding on the Supreme Court's holding in Winn, the Ore-
gon Court of Appeals clarified the Restatement test in Martin v.
Yunker. 14 1 The court stated that the first inquiry under the
Restatement approach is whether the alleged conduct is "privi-
leged." 42 There are certain categories of conduct, which are by
their very nature tortious, that are denied liability by virtue of
some privilege created either by consent or by law.' 43 If such a
privilege does exist, then no liability arises on the part of the par-
ent. However, if there is no privilege, then the court must move
on to the next step, which asks whether the alleged conduct can
properly be characterized as "not tortious conduct."' 44
The next step, determining whether parental conduct is "not
tortious", is a two-step process. 45 First, it must be determined
140. Id. at 784.
141. 853 P.2d 1332 (Or. Ct. App. 1993).
142. Id. at 1333.
143. Id. at 1333-1334; See also Alpar v. Weyerhaeuser Co., Inc., 20 N.C. App.
340, 346, 201 S.E.2d 503, 507, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 85, 203 S.E.2d 57 (1974) (a
qualified privilege exists for statements which would otherwise be defamatory
when such statements were made in the corporate interest, and no showing of
actual malice or excessive publication exists).
144. Id. at 1334; The court also stated that while the Supreme Court did not
articulate any broad rule for classifying parental conduct as tortious or "not
tortious" in Winn, under section 895G it did suggest that:
[iut is possible to distinguish between those obligations that a parent
owes his or her child specifically by virtue of parenthood from the
general duty of ordinary care to avoid foreseeable harm that the
defendant would owe to other persons . . . under the same
circumstances. Negligence suffices to make the parent liable for the
child's injury in the second kind of case though perhaps not for
substandard performance of specifically parental duties, where a more
stringent test... may remain proper.
Id. (quoting Winn v. Gilroy, 681 P.2d at 785); The Restatement states that "[ilf
the conduct giving rise to an injury does not grow directly out of the family
relationship, the existence of negligence may be determined as if the parties were
not related." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G, cmt. K at 430. Further,
"if the conduct grows directly out of the family relationship, it may be considered
tortious only if it is 'palpably unreasonable.'" Id. Note, that the phrase "grows
directly out of the family relationship" can be interpreted to include the provision
of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, as well as other acts as
the court deems appropriate.
145. Id.
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whether the conduct involves "strictly parental obligations."146 If
the conduct does not involve such obligations, then it may be eval-
uated under an ordinary negligence standard, regardless of the
relationship of the parties. 14 7 However, if the conduct does
involve such obligations, then liability aries only when the con-
duct is "palpably unreasonable," not when it is "merely unreason-
able."148 And, although the term "palpably unreasonable" is not
defined in the Restatement, the standard of "gross negligence"
closely resembles how some courts have applied the term. 1 4 9 Fur-
ther, in North Carolina, our courts have defined "gross negligence"
as "wanton conduct done with conscious or reckless disregard for
the rights and safety of others." 50
D. Application of Restatement Alternative to Facts of Liner v.
Brown
Applying this Restatement test to the facts of Liner, a similar
result would be reached and the defendants would be liable.
The first question is whether a privilege exists in this case.' 5'
Since the Liner court did not specifically address this question, it
is difficult to ascertain whether such a privilege exists. However,
it does not appear from the party's pleadings that such a privilege
existed at the time of Ambra's death.
146. Id.; The Winn court "mentions a number of possibilities concerning the
nature of obligations that arise out of the family relationship, including the
parent's responsibility for the physical conditions in the home, for food and
medical care, for recreation, sports, toys, and games, and for general
supervision." Id. at 1334, quoting Winn v. Gilroy, 681 P.2d at 785. However, the
Martin court noted that it was "not convinced that the category of 'not tortious'
parental conduct extends to all conduct that involves 'general supervision.' Such
a test would leave little, if any, parental conduct subject to liability... " Id. at
1335.
147. Id. at 1334.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1335.
150. Fowler v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 92 N.C. App. 733,
736, 376 S.E.2d 11, 13, review denied, 324 N.C. 577, 381 S.E.2d 773 (1989); See
also Siders v. Gibbs, 31 N.C. App. 481, 229 S.E.2d 811 (1976) (the court defined
"wanton negligence" as conduct which shows either a deliberate intention to
harm, or an utter indifference to, or conscious disregard for, the rights or safety
of others." Id. at 485, 229 S.E.2d at 814. Further, the court stated that
"'carelessness and recklessness,' though more than ordinary negligence, is less
than wilfulness or wantonness." Id).
151. See supra notes 142-143 and accompanying text.
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The next question is whether the alleged conduct involved is
"not tortious."152 This involves a two-step process. 153 The first
step is to determine whether the conduct involves "strictly paren-
tal obligations. " 154 As stated previously, the Winn court illus-
trated a number of possibilities for such conduct, including "the
parent's responsibility for the physical conditions in the home, for
food and medical care, for recreation, sports, toys, and games, and
for general supervision.
In this case, Ambra was swimming in the defendants' pool
when she drowned. Arguably, this conduct involves "recreation"
or "general supervision," and therefore should be deemed to
involve "strictly parental obligations." Therefore, in order for lia-
bility to exist, the conduct must be "palpably unreasonable," and
not "merely unreasonable." 56 Further, in North Carolina conduct
is "plapably unreasonable" if it involves "wanton conduct done
with conscious or reckless disregard for the rights and safety of
others."' 5 7 Under these facts, a compelling case could be made
that the defendants' lack of supervision of Ambra consitutes a
"reckless disregard" for her rights and safety, and is therefore
"palpably unreasonable." If this is the case, liability would attach
to the defendants under this Restatement approach, just as it did
under the Liner court's analysis.
E. Conclusion
Although the N.C. Court of Appeals further limited the appli-
cation of the parental immunity doctrine in Liner, the court's deci-
sion did not go far enough. While the clear judicial trend across
the nation has been to severely limit or totally abrogate the doc-
trine, 158 the North Carolina legislative and judicial branches
have consistently refused to do so. 159
Given the fact that the doctrine is a creature of the courts,
and "[t]he courts are in a better position to judge the uniqueness
152. See supra notes 145-150 and accompanying text.
153. See Martin, 853 P.2d at 1334.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1334 (quoting Winn v. Gilroy, 681 P.2d at 785). However, the
Martin court refused to extend the category of "not tortious" parental conduct "to
all conduct that involves 'general supervision.'" Id. at 1335.
156. Id. at 1334.
157. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 53-54.
159. See supra note 55.
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of the parent-child relationship,"160 North Carolina courts should
completely abrogate the doctrine in favor of a more flexible
approach. The United States Supreme Court has echoed this
same sentiment, stating that "[wihen precedent and precedent
alone is all the argument that can be made to support a court-
fashioned rule, it is time for the rule's creator to destroy it." 16 '
All three alternative approaches have "abolishe[d] [or
severely restricted] the doctrine and replace[d] it with a narrow
rule respecting the role of parental discipline."162 "This is to be
preferred over an ad hoc approach, maintaining the parental
immunity rule but carving our exceptions as they arise."163
However, the Restatement approach utilizes the rationales
advanced by both the Goller and Gibson courts, and expands on
these by "[taking] into consideration the uniqueness of family
relationships and [giving] guidelines for the courts to follow." 164
Further, the Restatement sets out guidelines for courts to follow
in determining liability, which the Oregon courts have adopted.
Therefore, this approach seems to be the preferred choice.
If the North Carolina courts stand idly by and continue to
refuse to abolish the doctrine, and the legislature continues to
only minimally restrict the doctrine's application, the children of
the State will continue to be prevented to "plead at her altar of
justice"165 wrongs done to them by their parents under the guise
of the doctrine.
160. See Elizabeth Ashley Baker, Closing One Door on the Parent-Child
Immunity Doctrine: Legislature Rejects the Decision of Coffey v. Coffey, 13
CAMPBELL L. REV. 105 (1990).
161. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48 (1980), (quoting Francis v.
Southern Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445, 471 (1948) (Black, J., dissenting)). The Court
also stated that "we cannot escape the reality that the law on occasion adheres to
doctrinal concepts long after the reasons which gave them birth have
disappeared and after experience suggests the need for change." Id.
162. Lee, 76 N.C. App. at 564, 334 S.E.2d at 255.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
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IV. PROTECTIONS SUCH AS PARENTAL IMMUNITY OR STATE-
FUNDED INSURANCE SHOULD BE EXTENDED TO FOSTER
PARENTS IN NORTH CAROLINA
A Introduction
American Courts developed the parental immunity doctrine
in an attempt to preserve harmony and tranquility among family
members.' 66 The parental immunity doctrine functions as an
absolute bar to a child bringing a negligence tort suit against his
parents.167 The modern trend has been to abolish or restrict this
type of immunity. 16 North Carolina adopted the parental immu-
nity doctrine in 1923.169 North Carolina's version of the doctrine
provides that "an unemancipated minor child cannot maintain a
tort action against his parent for personal injuries, even though
the parent's liability is covered by insurance."170 However, North
Carolina has partially abrogated the immunity by enacting a stat-
ute that makes the doctrine inapplicable to actions "arising out of
the operation of a motor vehicle owned or operated by the parent
or child."' 7'
Several states have extended the parental immunity doctrine
to apply to those persons standing in loco parentis.172 In North
Carolina, the Court of Appeals has defined in loco parentis to
mean "in the place of a parent."17 North Carolina, however, does
not recognize foster parents standing in loco parentis as meriting
the protection of the parental immunity doctrine.' 74 The North
Carolina Court of Appeals held in Liner v. Brown 175 that the
defendant foster parents did not stand in loco parentis to their
foster child who drowned in defendants' backyard swimming
166. 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 127 (1978).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 584, 118 S.E. 12, 15 (1923)
(unemancipated minor sued her father for injuries sustained in an automobile
accident).
170. Gillikin v. Burbage, 263 N.C. 317, 321, 139 S.E.2d 753, 757 (1965).
171. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (1993).
172. See, e.g., Lawber v. Diol, 547 N.E.2d 752 (Ill. App. 1989); Hush v.
Devilbiss Co., 259 N.W.2d 170, 174 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977); Thelen v. Thelen, 435
N.W.2d 495 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); Miller v. Pelzer, 199 N.W. 97 (Minn. 1924).
173. 117 N.C. App. 44, 449 S.E.2d 905 (1994), disc. review denied, 340 N.C.
113, 456 S.E.2d 315 (1995). A person in loco parentis is "one who assumed the
status and obligations of a parent without a formal adoption."
174. Id.
175. Id.
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pool. 176 The Court reasoned that even if defendants did stand in
loco parentis, they would not be entitled to parental immunity
since extending the doctrine to those having temporary custody
and control of a minor child does not further the public policy
underlying the doctrine. 17 7 Some of these policies include the
maintenance of family harmony, the preservation of parental
authority and security in the home, and the protection of financial
resources of the family. 178
In my analysis I will discuss the Liner court's interpretation
of the parental immunity doctrine as it relates to foster parents
and persons standing in loco parentis to foster children. I will also
examine the origins of the parental immunity doctrine and its
development in North Carolina as well as in other jurisdictions. I
will then analyze the justifications offered in support of extending
parental immunity to foster parents and explore the alternatives
to parental immunity that can still offer protection for foster par-
ents. I will then conclude that North Carolina needs to take some
action to protect foster parents from suits by a foster child by pro-
viding state-funded insurance for foster parents.
B. Background
1. History of the Parental Immunity Doctrine
As previously noted, American Courts developed the parental
immunity doctrine in an attempt to preserve harmony and tran-
quility among family members.' 79 In 1891, the Mississippi
Supreme Court became the first American court to establish the
parental immunity doctrine. 1 0 This doctrine was unique in
American courts, as parental immunity was not recognized at
English common law.'"' The parental immunity doctrine disal-
lows a tort action by a child against a parent.18 2 The main pur-
pose behind this immunity is to avoid the disruption of family
harmony.188
176. Id.
177. Id. at 51, 449 S.E.2d at 909.
178. Id. at 50, 449 S.E.2d at 908.
179. 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child §127 (1978).
180. Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891).
181. See W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 122, at 859-860 (5th ed. 1984).
182. Id.
183. Hewlett, 9 So. at 887.
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In McKelvey v. McKelvey, 's 4 the Tennessee Supreme Court
used the parental tort immunity doctrine to deny a child's cause of
action against his father and stepmother for cruel and inhumane
punishment. The Court compared parental immunity to spousal
immunity and concluded that in a parent-child situation, a parent
was given custody and control of a child in exchange for a parent's
duty to provide support for the child.' 8 5
In Roller v. Roller, ' 6 the Washington Supreme Court disal-
lowed a compensatory award to a minor child who had been raped
by her father.18 7 The court reasoned that the financial welfare of
the other minor children in the family had to be considered in
denying the award to a particular child.'8 In addition to family
harmony justifications, the court rejected the award to the child
on the ground that the parent would probably, upon the child's
death, "become heir to the very property which had been wrested
by the law from him."189
2. Justifications for the Parental Immunity Doctrine
Several reasons are enumerated by the courts in support of
the parental immunity doctrine. These reasons include: (1) pre-
vention of the disruption of family harmony; 190 (2) a reluctance by
courts to interfere with parental control and discipline;' 91 (3) the
possibility that the parent might regain the child's monetary dam-
ages through inheritance; 19 2 (4) depletion of parental assets to the
detriment of the injured child's siblings; 93 and (5) the possibility
of fraud and collusion between parent and child to obtain insur-
ance money.19 4 Most jurisdictions that continue to maintain the
184. 77 S.W. 664 (Tenn. 1903).
185. Id. The comparison fails because the spousal immunity is based on the
common law theory that the spouses represent a singular entity, whereas courts
have never defined the parent-child relationship as one entity.
186. 79 P. 788 (Wash. 1905).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 789.
190. Hewellette, 9 So. at 887; Small, 185 N.C. at 585, 118 S.E. at 16.
191. See, e.g., Barlow v. Iblings, 156 N.W.2d 105, 107-108 (Iowa 1968);
McKelvey v. McKelvey, 77 S.W. 664 (Tenn. 1903), Small, 185 N.C. at 584, 118
S.E. at 15.
192. Roller, 79 P. at 789.
193. Id.
194. See, e.g., Lee v. Mowett Sales Co., 76 N.C. App. 556, 562, 334 S.E.2d 250,
254 (1985) (Becton, J., dissenting), affd, 316 N.C. 489, 342 S.E.2d 882 (1986);
Parks v. Parks, 135 A.2d 65, 73 (Pa. 1957).
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parental immunity doctrine justify its continuance on public pol-
icy grounds of promotion of family harmony195 and maintenance of
parental discipline.196
3. The Development of the Doctrine in North Carolina
North Carolina first adopted the parental immunity doctrine
in 1923.197 North Carolina courts feared that suits brought by
children against their parents for negligent injury would "tend to
destroy parental authority and to undermine the security of the
home."198 Thus, the doctrine has been applied to bar actions
between unemancipated children against their parents based on
ordinary negligence. 199
The history of the parental immunity doctrine shows that
maintenance of family harmony was the most important public
policy rationale that the doctrine was intended to serve.20 0 How-
ever, basing the parental immunity doctrine primarily on this
rationale fails to support the parental immunity doctrine in North
Carolina because North Carolina recognizes various intrafamily
liabilities. For example, North Carolina courts have permitted:
(1) unemancipated minors to sue their parents for contract and
property rights;201 (2) unemancipated minors to sue their parents
for intentional torts;202 (3) emancipated children to sue their par-
ents;203 (4) unemancipated siblings to sue each other;20 4 and (5)
spouses to sue one another (now that North Carolina has abol-
ished interspousal immunity).20 5
195. See, e.g., Hewellette, 9 So. at 887; Barlow v. Iblings, 156 N.W.2d 105, 107-
108 (Iowa 1968); Small, 185 N.C. at 579-580, 118 S.E. at 13.
196. See, e.g., Barlow, 156 N.W.2d at 107-108; Small, 185 N.C. at 584, 118 S.E.
at 15.
197. Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923).
198. Id. at 584, 118 S.E. at 15.
199. Lee, 316 N.C. at 491, 342 S.E.2d at 884; Skinner v. Whitley, 281 N.C. 476,
484, 189 S.E.2d 230, 235 (1972).
200. Lee, 316 N.C. at 492, 342 S.E.2d at 884; Skinner, 281 N.C. at 480, 189
S.E.2d at 232.
201. Lee, 316 N.C. at 492, 342 S.E.2d at 884; See also Homer H. Clark, Jr., LAw
OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 9.2 (1968); 59 AM. Jua. 2d Parent and Child § 148
(1971).
202. Lee, 316 N.C. at 492, 342 S.E.2d at 884; Doe v. Holt, 332 N.C. 90, 418
S.E.2d 511 (1992).
203. Gillikin v. Burbage, 263 N.C. 317, 321, 139 S.E.2d 753, 757 (1965).
204. 3 ROBERT E. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAw § 248, at 294 (4th ed.
Cumin. Supp. 1994) [hereinafter ROBERT E. LEE].
205. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-5 (1984).
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In 1952 the North Carolina Supreme Court refused to abolish
parental immunity, since no statute existed overruling Small v.
Morrison,2 06 and no other state had abrogated the immunity for
acts of negligence.20 7 In 1972, the North Carolina Supreme Court
denied another request to abolish the parental immunity in Skin-
ner v. Whitley, 20 8 reiterating its belief that this was the legisla-
ture's job.20 9 The request to abolish parental immunity was again
denied in Lee v. Mowett Sales Co. 210 and in Coffey v. Coffey. 211
Thus in North Carolina, absent statutory authority, an
unemancipated minor child cannot maintain a tort action against
his parents for personal injuries.212 However, subsequent cases
have eroded the protection provided by the parental immunity
doctrine. For example, the parental immunity doctrine does not
apply to injuries willfully or maliciously inflicted.21 3 In addition,
North Carolina has abolished, by statute, a parent's immunity
from a tort suit for personal injuries to his unemancipated minor
child in cases involving the operation of a motor vehicle. 4 Fur-
thermore, North Carolina General Statute § 1-539.21 has been
amended to remove the immunity of a child from suit by the
child's parent for injuries or wrongful death arising out of the
operation of a motor vehicle owned or operated by the child.215
The current North Carolina General Statute § 1-539.21 states
that "the relationship of parent and child shall not bar the right of
action by a person or his estate against his parent or child for
wrongful death, personal injury, or property damage arising out of
operation of a motor vehicle owned or operated by the parent or
child."21 6 This statute was held to be constitutional in Ledwell v.
206. 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923).
207. Redding v. Redding, 235 N.C. 638, 639, 70 S.E.2d 676, 677 (1952).
208. Skinner, 281 N.C. 476, 189 S.E.2d 230 (1972) (estate of two deceased
daughters sued the estate of their father for wrongful death in an automobile
accident).
209. Id.
210. Lee, 316 N.C. 489, 494, 342 S.E.2d 882, 885 (1986) (father injured
daughter when he backed over her foot with a riding lawnmower and
manufacturer brought a third-party claim for contribution against the father).
211. 94 N.C. App. 717, 721, 381 S.E.2d 467, 470 (1989) (unemancipated minor
driving an automobile crashed and injured his passenger mother, but the
mother's right to sue did not exist at the time of the injury).
212. See LEE, supra note 204.
213. Doe v. Holt, 332 N.C. 90, 418 S.E.2d 511 (1992).
214. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (1993).
215. Id.
216. Id.
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Berry21 7 and Allen v. Allen.218 The vast majority of North Caro-
lina cases involving suits between a parent and a child arise in the
context of a motor vehicle accident.21 9
With regard to persons standing in loco parentis, the general
rule in North Carolina is that a minor child cannot recover from a
person standing in loco parentis for personal injuries resulting
from ordinary negligence. 220 A person in loco parentis stands "in
the place of a parent"2 2 1 and is defined as one who takes a child
into his own home and treats the child as a member of his own
family, educating and supporting the child as if he were the per-
son's own child.222 In addition to the use of the parental immunity
doctrine to shield natural parents from suits by their children,
North Carolina has also extended the doctrine to stepparents
standing in loco parentis.223 Courts have surmised that the
parental immunity doctrine applies to stepparents because they
are more permanent in nature to a child's life when compared to
foster parents who only have temporary custody and control of the
child.224
However, North Carolina courts have stated that temporary
status attaches to foster parents standing in loco parentis, since
the relationship exists at the will of the party assuming the obli-
gations of a parent.22 5 In 1980, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals stated that an in loco parentis relationship does not arise
"from the mere placing of a child in the temporary care of other
persons by a parent or guardian of such child."226 Thus, such a
relationship is established only when the person with whom the
child is placed intends to assume the status of a parent, and takes
on obligations incidental to a parental relationship, particularly
support and maintenance.22 7
217. 39 N.C. App. 224, 249 S.E.2d 862 (1978)
218. 76 N.C. App. 504, 333 S.E.2d 530 (1985).
219. See LEE, supra note 204.
220. See LEE, supra note 204.
221. Id.
222. Id. (citing Shook v. Peavy, 23 N.C. App. 230, 208 S.E.2d 433 (1974));
Morgan v. Johnson, 24 N.C. App. 307, 308, 210 S.E.2d 503, 504 (1974).
223. See, e.g., Morgan v. Johnson, 24 N.C. App. 307, 210 S.E.2d 503 (1974);
Mabry v. Bowen, 14 N.C. App. 646, 188 S.E.2d 651 (1972).
224. Id.
225. See LEE, supra note 204 (citing 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 154 (1978)).
226. State v. Pittard, 45 N.C. App. 701, 703, 263 S.E.2d 809, 811 (1980).
227. Id. A court will look to all of the facts and circumstances surrounding a
particular case in order to determine whether one stands in loco parentis. A
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4. The Parental Immunity Doctrine as it Applies to Foster
Parents
a. Granting Immunity to Persons Related to the Child
Courts must first decide whether a foster parent stands in
loco parentis to the foster child to determine if a foster parent can
assert parental immunity for negligent conduct.2 28 In Hush v.
Devilbiss Co., 229 a grandmother acting in loco parentis was pro-
tected from a negligent supervision suit. The Hush Court held
that the rationales underlying parental immunity, including pres-
ervation of domestic tranquility and family unity, protection of
family resources, and avoidance of judicial intervention in parent-
ing decisions, were equally applicable where a person voluntarily
assumes parental responsibility and attempts to create a home-
like environment for a child.23 °
In Lawber v. Doil,23 ' the Appellate Court of Illinois allowed a
stepfather to invoke the parental immunity doctrine even though
he was not the decedent's natural father and legal custody of the
decedent child was with the plaintiff mother.232 The Doil court
held that parental immunity applied not only to the natural par-
ents of the child, but also to those who stand in loco parentis.233
The Doil court reasoned further that a finding of in loco parentis
status involved a determination of whether the defendant had
assumed the financial burdens of parenthood rather than whether
the defendant had made financial contributions.234
person receiving financial assistance from welfare agencies to assist him with the
support of a child will not be precluded from being considered in loco parentis to
a child. However, if a child is supported by the agency and only boards with the
person claiming to be in loco parentis, such a relationship will be found to be
negated.
228. Liner, 117 N.C. App. at 48, 449 S.E.2d at 907. As stated earlier, a person
stands in loco parentis to an unemancipated minor child if he has assumed the
status and obligation of a parent without a formal adoption. See also McManus
v. Hinney, 143 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Wis. 1966). Whether an in loco parentis relationship
exists is determined from the facts of a particular case. Factors considered to
determine whether a person stands in loco parentis include the children's ages,
their dependence upon the person claiming to be in loco parentis, and whether
the person claiming to be in loco parentis supports the children and exercises the
duties and obligations of a natural parent.
229. 259 N.W.2d 170, 174 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).
230. Id.
231. 547 N.E.2d 752 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
232. Id. at 753.
233. Id.
234. Id.
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b. Granting Immunity to Foster Parents
Foster family care is "the child welfare service that provides
substitute family care for a planned period for a child when his
own family cannot care for him, for a temporary or extended
period, and when adoption is either not yet possible or not desira-
ble."23 5 A foster parent performs the duties of a parent to the child
of another by rearing the child as his own child. 3 6 Common sense
dictates that the failure of our courts and/or legislature to provide
some minimal protections to foster parents means that people will
be less likely to offer to take in foster children. 3 7 For this reason,
other jurisdictions do not automatically exclude foster parents
from an in loco parentis status.23 8
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Miller v. Pelzer,239 was the
first appellate court to grant in loco parentis status to foster par-
ents. The Miller court declared that the public policy of protecting
the unity of the home from suits by an unemancipated minor was
equally applicable to a home provided by foster parents.2 4 ° In
Miller, a foster child sued her foster parents for fraud and deceit
when she learned she was a foster child rather than the natural
child of her foster parents.24 1 The foster daughter stayed in
defendants' home for twenty-five years without the knowledge
that defendants were not her natural parents.242 The Miller court
reasoned that the family relationship in this case was just as
sacred as if the plaintiff had been the defendants' natural daugh-
ter.243 This court also noted the public policy that family settle-
ments are favored in the law, and the good of society requires that
the family relation be preserved, protected, and encouraged, and
an occasional misfortune to one who has a grievance of this char-
acter is of far less importance than to establish a precedent which
235. CHInD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERiCA, STANDARDS FOR FOSTER FAMILY
SERVICE 8 (1975).
236. BLAciKs LAw DICTIONARY 656 (6th ed. 1990).
237. Karen P. Wackerman, The Second Circuit Review-1982-1983 Term:
Constitutional Law: The Due Process Rights of Foster Parents, 50 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 483, 505 (1984).
238. See, e.g., Rayburn v. Moore, 241 So. 2d 675 (Miss. 1970); Nelson v.
Johansen, 24 N.W. 730 (Neb. 1885).
239. 199 N.W. 97 (Minn. 1924).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
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will open wide the gates for litigation affecting the family
relation.2 44
Although the parental immunity doctrine has since been abol-
ished in Minnesota, foster parents in that state still receive statu-
tory protections.2'5
Since the 1986 decision of Brown v. Phillips,2' 6 Georgia has
held that foster parents are clothed with parental immunity iden-
tical to that afforded to natural parents. Georgia courts reasoned
that preservation of family tranquility, even in foster families,
was an important public policy consideration. 24 7 Therefore, foster
parents are entitled to assert parental immunity as a defense to
any action brought against them by their foster children for torts
allegedly committed by them during the period that they stood in
loco parentis.2 4 8
c. Cases Not Granting Immunity to Foster Parents
A foster care arrangement typically involves a preexisting
contractual arrangement between a state department of social
services and the foster parents in which the foster parents are
compensated for expenses incurred in caring for the child.249 The
goal of foster care is:
not to create a new family unit or encourage permanent emotional
ties between the child and foster parents. Foster care is designed
to provide a stable nurturing environment for the child while the
natural parent attempts to remedy the problems which precipi-
244. Id. at 98.
245. See MiNN. STAT. ANN. §245.814 (West Supp. 1986) (provides that the
commissioner of human services shall purchase and provide insurance to foster
parents to cover their liability for injuries or property damage caused or
sustained by foster children in their home).
246. 342 S.E.2d 786 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
247. Brown, 342 S.E. 2d at 787-88.
248. Newsome v. Dep't of Human Resources, 405 S.E.2d 61, 62 (Ga. Ct. App.
1991) (citing Brown v. Phillips, 342 S.E.2d 786 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)). The Georgia
Court of Appeals stated that:
when a parenting relationship exists, even on an impermanent basis,
allowing suit against the parent on behalf of the child violates the public
policy of [the] state favoring the preservation of family tranquility and
affording to foster children an environment which resembles, as much as
is possible, a natural family.
However, the court reasoned that if the foster relationship no longer exists
between the parties, the reasons behind the grant of the immunity are cancelled.
249. Mayberry v. Pryor, 374 N.W.2d 683, 686 (Mich. 1985).
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tated the child's removal or until suitable adoptive parents are
found.2
50
Several courts have refused to extend the parental immunity
doctrine to those standing temporarily in loco parentis. At least
one court has reasoned that persons standing in loco parentis
"may not shut [their] eyes to obvious danger threatening the
moral or physical well-being of the child committed to [their] cus-
tody and plead nonliability when injury, due to [their] failure to
exercise that degree of care incumbent upon [them] under the cir-
cumstances, results."25 '
For reasons such as these, the Michigan Supreme Court, in
Mayberry v. Pryor,252 did not allow foster parents to invoke the
defense of parental immunity in an action by a foster child for
damages arising from negligent supervision. The Pryor court
found that foster parents may indeed be held liable for negligent
conduct proximately causing injury to a foster child.253 This Court
reasoned that foster parents knowingly and voluntarily assume a
contractual duty to provide supervisory care and therefore they
should be held responsible for any failure to use reasonable
care. 254 Moreover, the Pryor court found that when the injury
occurred, the foster child was usually visiting or being cared for by
these persons with the natural parents' consent.255 Finally, the
court found that the policy rationales underlying the parental
immunity doctrine such as promotion of domestic harmony, pre-
serving family resources, and judicial nonintervention in parent-
ing decisions, did not justify extending the defense to foster
parents.256
The Arizona Court of Appeals, in Rourk v. State,257 held that
the parental immunity doctrine does not protect foster parents
from suit for the negligent supervision of a foster child if the foster
parents are not related to the child by blood, marriage, or adop-
tion, or are not providing long-term foster care in contemplation of
250. Id. at 686-87.
251. Fox v. Mission of Immaculate Virgin for Protection of Homeless &
Destitute Children, 202 Misc. 478, 480 (N.Y. 1952) (citing 67 C.J.S., Parent and
Child, § 75 (1978)).
252. 374 N.W.2d 683 (Mich. 1985).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 687.
255. Id. at 685.
256. Id. at 689.
257. 821 P.2d 273 (Ariz. 1991).
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adoption.258  Arizona, like Michigan, abolished the parental
immunity doctrine except in situations involving supervision and
the provision of ordinary care.2 59 In Rourk, the foster child sued
her foster parents for negligent supervision after she was injured
in an automobile accident when she was returning home from a
teenage drinking party.260 The court noted that the majority of
cases giving the benefits of the parental immunity doctrine to per-
sons standing in loco parentis to a child involved stepparents,
adoptive parents, grandparents, and other persons related by
blood marriage, or adoption.261 However, the court stated that
foster parents are usually not related to the child by blood, mar-
riage, or adoption and they are brought together by a contract
between the state and the foster parents.26 2 Moreover, the court
noted that the parental immunity doctrine promotes family well-
being and tranquility. 263 The court stated that extending the doc-
trine to unrelated foster parents does not further these policy
objectives.264
The Supreme Court of New York also has held that a foster
child may not sue a foster parent for negligent supervision.26 5 The
court gave four rationales including: (1) the distinctions between
the foster family and the natural family;266 (2) the temporary rela-
tionship between foster families and foster children;267 (3) the
objective of the foster family to facilitate the return of a child to
258. Id. (The courts may have a hard time determining a meaning for
"contemplation of adoption".).
259. Id. at 275.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 277. See, e.g., Thelen v. Thelen, 435 N.W.2d 495 (Mich. Ct. App.
1989) (granting immunity to stepparents).
262. Id. (citing Mayberry, 375 N.W.2d at 685-686).
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Andrews v. Otsego, 112 Misc. 2d 37, 41 (N.Y. 1982).
266. Id. at 41-43. The court observed that foster parents are only paid contract
service providers and their contractual relationship, rather than emotional ties,
dictates the duties the foster parents owe to their foster children.
267. Id. Therefore foster parents do not assume all the legal obligations of
natural parents. Also the welfare agency retains legal custody of the child
although the foster parents provide for the child's daily care.
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the child's biological parents;26 and (4) improper supervision as a
basis for termination of the foster family relationship.26 9
d. Other Jurisdictions
Some jurisdictions have held that juvenile caseworkers and
shelter care or foster parents are generally immune from liability
for acts and omissions relating to the supervision, care, and cus-
tody of a minor child.27 ° Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire,
and Wisconsin have already embraced this approach by requiring
their respective commissioners of human services to supply insur-
ance coverage for any injuries that foster children sustain while in
their foster parents' household.271 This approach shields foster
parents or other persons standing in loco parentis, from economi-
cally damaging lawsuits while providing compensation for the
injured foster child.272
In Pickett v. Washington County,273 the Oregon Court of
Appeals concluded that foster or shelter care parents were
immune from liability for negligence arising from failure to ade-
quately supervise a runaway juvenile. The Pickett court founded
this immunity on the doctrine of public official immunity since fos-
ter parents perform services similar to a public officer engaging in
a discretionary act.2 74 Two important considerations included the
importance of the government function involved and the extent to
which governmental liability might impair the exercise of that
function.275 The Oregon Court of Appeals noted that foster or
shelter care parents are continually called upon to make delicate
and complex judgments involving the weighing of risks, much like
a public official.276 The Pickett court believed that if these foster
parents adopt a policy too restrictive toward a particular child,
"the child's development might be stifled whereas liberality might
268. Id. at 43. The natural parent retains a paramount right to raise the child.
269. Id. at 44. It would be inconsistent to suspend a foster parent's license for
negligent supervision and then deny a foster child a cause of action for injuries
sustained as a result of that negligence.
270. Vincent S. Nadile, Promoting the Integrity of Foster Family Relationships:
Needed Statutory Protections for Foster Parents, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 221, 227
(1987).
271. Id. at 230.
272. Id.
273. 572 P.2d 1070, 1073 (Or. Ct. App. 1977).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 1074.
276. Id.
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endanger the safety of the child and others."277 The Pickett court
stated that these decisions focusing on discretion "should not be
subject to hindsight scrutiny by courts and juries."2 7' The court
did not reach the question of parental immunity for persons
standing in loco parentis because the court found that the defend-
ants were immune from discretionary acts.279
C. Analysis
1. Liner v. Brown: The Court's Decision
Liner v. Brown28 0 was the first North Carolina case interpret-
ing the parental immunity doctrine as it applies to foster parents
and their foster children. The majority opinion of the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals in Liner concluded that those persons stand-
ing in loco parentis having temporary control and custody of a
minor are not protected by the parental immunity doctrine
because the extension would not further the policies underlying
the doctrine. 2 11 However, as Judge John stated in his concur-
rence, the majority failed to recognize that the consequential
rights and duties of foster parents and natural parents are sub-
stantially the same despite the temporary nature of the in loco
parentis status of foster parents.28 2 Often, emotional ties between
a foster parent and a foster child are quite close, and "undoubtedly
in some [cases] as close as those existing in biological families."28 3
In addition, the Liner court failed to recognize that the defendants
had a preexisting familial bond with the child, as they were the
child's aunt and uncle. Thus, the Liner court essentially ignored
the public policy concerns of family harmony in this situation.
The Liner court also neglected to consider the possible detri-
mental effects of imposing liability on foster parents. Failing to
protect foster parents from negligence suits brought by their fos-
ter children may discourage many individuals from becoming fos-
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 1075 (C.f Headrick v. Parker, No. 224 (Tenn., Feb. 24, 1984)
(LEXIS, State library, Tenn. file) where the Tennessee Supreme Court held in
this unpublished opinion that the General Assembly did not purport to grant
statutory immunity to foster parents prior to its statutory enactments in 1984
and 1985. The public policy of the state at the time of the accident was reflected
by the statutes then in effect.).
280. 117 N.C. App. 44, 449 S.E.2d 905 (1994).
281. Id.
282. Id. at 52, 449 S.E.2d at 909 (John, J., concurring).
283. Smith v. Offer, 431 US 816, 845 n.52 (1977).
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ter parents.28 4 Indeed, the Liner decision may have the potential
to limit the number of people willing to become foster parents for
fear of potential liability. Moreover, the Liner court failed to cre-
ate any alternative protections for foster parents sued by their fos-
ter children for negligent acts.
2. The Future of Parental Immunity
Recently, the judicial trend has been to narrow the extent of
parental immunity.28 5 As the parental relationship with the child
moves further away from that of natural parents and their child,
courts tend to lessen degrees of parental immunity.28 6 In general,
foster parents have failed to qualify for the parental immunity
doctrine because courts believe foster parents do not possess the
traditional attributes of parental responsibility, and also because
foster care is contractual and temporary in nature.28 7 North Caro-
lina followed this judicial trend and disallowed parental immunity
for foster parents in 1994.288
This judicial trend ignores the increasingly familial nature of
foster care. Foster parents often provide food, shelter, and disci-
pline for foster children in their homes in much the same manner
as a natural parent does.28 9 In addition, foster parents attempt to
meet the emotional needs of the children. 290 Therefore, some type
of liability protection for foster parents should be provided which
also safeguards the interests of the children entrusted to their
care.
3. Alternatives Providing Protection for Foster Parents in
North Carolina
North Carolina could adopt Oregon's approach which allows
foster parents to be considered state employees who enjoy immu-
nity from liability for any acts concerning the supervision and care
of their foster children. 2 9 1 Therefore, foster parents in North Car-
olina could be afforded some type of protection from suits by their
foster children. Moreover, parental immunity of foster parents
284. Nadile, supra note 270, at 229.
285. 59 AM. Jun. 2d, Parent and Child § 151 (1971).
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Liner v. Brown, 117 N.C. App. 44, 449 S.E.2d 905 (1994).
289. Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So. 2d 801, 804 (Ala. 1992).
290. Id.
291. Pickett, 572 P.2d 1070 (Or. Ct. App. 1977).
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should be limited to negligent acts, rather than intentional acts,
occurring while the foster child is in their custody.
Some courts have permitted foster children to sue their foster
parents without the issue of parental immunity.292 A fair plan
provides some procedural protection to all foster families, while
giving additional protections to those foster families that have
been together longer because a greater presumption of a familial
bond between foster parent and foster child exists.293
In addition, North Carolina could adopt the Goller
approach.294 The Goller approach determines whether the injury
to the child arose out of parental authority or discipline over the
minor child.295  The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Goller v.
White, 296 created the first partial abolishment of parental immu-
nity.297 Goller involved a suit by a child against his father for neg-
ligently permitting the boy to ride on the drawbar of a tractor,
thus causing the child's injuries.298 In this case, the trial court
determined that the foster parent was standing in loco parentis to
the foster child, thus entitling him to the protection of the paren-
tal immunity doctrine.29 9 The court stated that parental immu-
nity would only apply when: (1) the allegedly negligent act
involves an exercise of parental authority over the child; or (2) the
allegedly negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary parental
discretion with regard to food, clothing, housing, medical and den-
tal services, etc.30 0  Thus, the Goller approach focuses upon
whether the injury arose out of parental authority or discipline
over the minor child. 30 1 The problem with the Goller approach is
determining which parental activities involve the exercise of
authority or discretion over the child.30 2 Furthermore, the Goller
292. Mayberry, 374 N.W.2d at 686. See, e.g., Vonner v. Department of Public
Welfare, 273 So.2d 252 (La. 1973) (holding a foster father liable on a breach of
contract theory for failing to provide proper board and care rather than for actual
participation in the beatings foster mother inflicted upon the foster child).
293. See Wackerman, supra note 237, at 507.
294. Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963).
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 196.
300. Id. at 198.
301. Id.
302. Wisconsin courts have subsequently interpreted the parental control and
authority exception to include those actions that are undertaken to discipline a
child. See, e.g., Howes v. Hansen, 201 N.W.2d 825 (Wis. 1972); Thoreson v.
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approach does not allow consideration of the factors which distin-
guish a foster family from a natural family, including perma-
nency, assumption of different levels of rights and obligations
toward the child, and the legal custody of the child. Finally, the
Goller approach fails to consider the necessity of the child welfare
services that foster parents provide.
The California Supreme Court established yet another alter-
native approach to the parental immunity doctrine in Gibson v.
Gibson.303 The Gibson court completely abrogated the parental
immunity doctrine and established a reasonable parent stan-
dard. °4 In Gibson, a child was injured by another automobile
when he got out of the family car at his father's request to adjust
the wheels of a jeep they were towing. 0 5 The court decided that
the father's conduct should be judged by what an ordinary reason-
able prudent person would have done under the circumstances in
light of the parental role. 0 6 In effect, this standard holds a parent
to a reasonableness standard regardless of the nature of his activ-
ity.3 0 7 The main criticism against this approach is that the court
is not in a position to judge the proper degree of discipline and
supervision of a particular child. 0 8
The Restatement (Second) of Torts subsequently adopted the
reasonably prudent parent standard from Gibson.3 0 9 The Restate-
ment also gives examples of actions that give rise to liability.310
The Restatement approach recognizes that certain acts and omis-
sions between a parent and a child should not be tortious even
when an injury occurs. 311 The Restatement view provides guide-
lines for parental activities that should not include liability.3 12
The Restatement notes that family life involves intended physical
Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Co., 201 N.W.2d 745 (Wis. 1972). Wisconsin
courts have also interpreted the parental discretion exception to include the
parents' right to raise and educate their children in accordance with their own
beliefs and values. See, e.g., Lemmon v. Servais, 158 N.W.2d 341 (Wis. 1968).
303. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971).
304. Id. at 653; see also Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980)
(adopted the reasonable parent standard).
305. Id. at 648.
306. Id. at 654.
307. Id.
308. "Reasonable Parent," supra note 119, at 810.
309. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G (1977).
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
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contact that would be actionable between strangers but may be
commonplace and expected within the family.3 1 This approach is
sound because foster parents would be treated just like natural
parents since they take on the same parental responsibilities.
However, this approach places the court in a position of deciding
what is reasonable parental behavior which would require a case-
by-case analysis of facts presented.
Another approach suggested by at least one case applies the
Goller rule (parental authority and discretion) and the Gibson test
(ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent) only to the extent of
liability insurance coverage. 14 Courts have stated that family
harmony would not be disrupted and family funds would not be
depleted since claims are paid by third parties such as insurance
companies.3 1 5 However, a problem with this system is that the
negligence claims are often not limited by the coverage amount of
the policy.
If North Carolina does not extend parental immunity to fos-
ter parents, the best alternative would be for North Carolina to
provide state-funded liability insurance for foster parents.31 6
However, this system would have to provide a way to limit claims
to the coverage amount provided by the insurance. This approach
seems to be the best solution for North Carolina because foster
parents are shielded from unintentional acts and foster children
are compensated for their injuries.
313. Id. at cmt. k.
314. Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1982).
315. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d 907, 914 (Mass 1975); Briere v. Briere,
224 A.2d 588, 591 (N.H. 1966).
316. Nadile, supra note 270 at 230. This state-funded insurance could
potentially become too expensive. Therefore, the extent of liability coverage
would have to be determined by the North Carolina legislature yearly. The
decision on the total dollar amount of coverage should include a consideration of
prior foster parent negligence cases in North Carolina. To decrease costs, North
Carolina should also allocate a small portion of the money foster parents are paid
to care for these foster children towards this protective insurance. This
additional protection to foster parents will more than compensate for a small
reduction in their pay. This small portion taken from foster parents' paychecks
should also be determined yearly by the legislature based on the economy. One
way to get this money is through taxes. Although people are often weary to pay
additional taxes, protection of our children is extremely important. This money
could be allotted directly to DSS to be applied to unintentional acts of negligent
supervision by foster parents standing in loco parentis. Another alternative is to
have part of the money paid to foster parents to be applied directly to this
protective insurance.
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Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Wisconsin have
already embraced this state-funded liability approach by requir-
ing the commissioner of human services to supply insurance cov-
erage for any injuries that foster children sustain while in their
foster parents' household.3 17 This approach shields foster parents
or those standing in loco parentis from economically damaging
lawsuits while providing compensation for the injured foster
child.3 18
D. Conclusion
North Carolina needs to respond to some of the more modern
family situations, including foster families, by creating new stan-
dards for determining those foster parents and persons in loco
parentis that are protected by the parental immunity doctrine
from suits brought by a minor child in their custody. North Caro-
lina courts need to recognize that foster parents fill what is usu-
ally considered a parental role and in many cases, the foster
parents have developed strong relationships with the child. Emo-
tional ties between foster parents and foster children often resem-
ble those existing in biological families. Failing to protect foster
parents from negligence suits brought by their foster children may
discourage many individuals from becoming foster parents.
Therefore, if North Carolina does not extend parental immunity
to foster parents, the courts or the legislature should provide other
alternatives to allow protection of the foster parents for their neg-
ligent conduct.
The best alternative for North Carolina is to have the legisla-
ture provide state-funded insurance (a type of state immunity) for
foster parents. This approach would allow foster parents to be
shielded from unintentional acts and foster children will be com-
pensated for their injuries. As noted by Justice Carley of the
Georgia Court of Appeals,"few, if any, citizens will elect to become
foster parents if the effect of that election is to invite a potential
plaintiff to live in one's home." 19
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Newsome v. Department of Human Resources, 405 S.E.2d at 67 (Carley,
J., concurring). Carley noted that an unemancipated foster or natural child is
not barred from suing his foster or natural parent for a willful or malicious tort.
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V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the North Carolina Court of Appeals caused
concern on both sides of the parental immunity debate in Liner v.
Brown when it refused to extend the doctrine to foster parents
standing in loco parentis. For the doctrine's opponents, the ruling
served merely as a "piecemeal abrogation" of the type that was
abhored by the Skinner court.3 20 And, for the doctrine's propo-
nents, the ruling was an illogical and unfair restriction of the doc-
trine's protections to foster parents.
The time has come for North Carolina to move forward in the
evolution of the doctrine and either completely abrogate the doc-
trine in favor of a more flexible approach, or allow all those who
stand in loco parentis, including foster parents, to receive its
benefit.
A. John Hoomani
Kimberly Sieredzki Woodell
320. See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
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